Inquiry: The University of Arkansas Undergraduate Research
Journal
Volume 8

Article 9

Fall 2007

What is Ailing the German Economy? A Critical Analysis of
German Social Market Economics
Robert T. Cheek Jr.
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry
Part of the European History Commons, and the International Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Cheek, R. T. (2007). What is Ailing the German Economy? A Critical Analysis of German Social Market
Economics. Inquiry: The University of Arkansas Undergraduate Research Journal, 8(1). Retrieved from
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol8/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Inquiry: The University of Arkansas Undergraduate Research Journal by an authorized editor of
ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.

Cheek: What is Ailing the German Economy? A Critical Analysis of German

46 INQUIRY Volume 8 2007

WHAT IS AILING THE GERMAN ECONOMY?
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF GERMAN SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMICS
By Robert T. Cheek Jr.
Department of Foreign Languages (German)

Faculty Mentor: Judith Ricker
Department of Foreign Languages (German)
Abstract
This paper offers a narrative historical description
of the German Social ,\farket Economy.from its inception
following JI(Jrld War II, up to the recent Agenda 2010 reforms
enacted under the administration of Chancellor Gerhard
Schroder. It is the purpose of this work to explore why the
German Social Market System enjoyed such a high degree of
success in its early years, and u·hich flaws might be causing
the chronic pmb/ems oflow growth and high unemployment
that have plagued Germany more recently. In particular. the
paper argues that a high-cost and highly inflexible labor
market resulting from Gennany :S system of autonomous
collectil'e wage bargaining may be stymieing business growth
and scaring mrayforeign investment.

Introduction
The health ofthe German economy is a topic of special
concern, not only for the people and politicians of Germany,
but also for all of the member countries of the European
Union. As the largest economy in Europe, Germany's
economic strength has significant influence on the \veil-being
of its neighbors. Since the mid-1970s, the German economy
has sutfered under struggling gross domestic product (GOP)
growth rates, with persistently high unemployment figures.
At the end of2006, eight percent of German workers were
unemployed. with unemployment rates in areas of the East
as high as 20%. Since reunification. Germany's real GOP
growth rate has averaged a meager 1.8% (OECD Statistics
2007). Economists and politicians alike point to the severe
weakness of the eastern German economy as a major cause
for the current situation. The cost of unification is estimated
to have exceeded E 1.5 trillion, and every year the German
government pumps €70 to €80 billion into the region costs
which consume four percent of the GOP annuall; (E~onomist
8. 2004). The high unemployment in the area has spurred
May
many of the young and skilled workers of the East to migrate
elsewhere, resulting in a dramatic aging of this population
and a loss in creative force. Apart from the problem of the
East. many experts point to an inflexible labor market as a
major cause for high unemployment numbers and see heavy
bureaucratic regulations imposed by the German government
as stymieing new business growth. Furthermore, weaknesses
such as high l~bor costs, poor worker flexibility, a heavy tax
burden, and h1gh energy costs are all cited as detractors which
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are keeping foreign and domestic investors from setting up
production facilities within Germany (Economist Aug. 20
2005).
In order to better understand the current problems
facing Germany's economy, it is useful to consider the
history of Germany's modem political and economic system.
Foilowing the defeat of Germany in 1945, the country was
occupied by the victorious Allied forces. Tom apart by the
emerging Cold War conflict, two states emerged from the
ruins of the Third Reich: the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) in the East, a communist regime with strong ties to
the Soviet Union, and the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) in the West with a liberal democratic constitution.
Although both states quickly recovered from the devastation
left by the Second World War, Western Germany stood
out in the following decades as a Wirtschaftswunder, or
"economic miracle," quickly becoming one of the strongest
economies in Europe. This period of economic growth would
continue all the way into the early 1970s. At the core of the
new development strategy for West Germany was the swift
introduction of the Social Market Economy, combined with
substantial financial transfers under the Marshal Plan and
a currency reform enacted in 1948. Fueled by a heightened
world-wide demand for industrial goods brought on by the
Korean War, the period of the German economic miracle
was characterized by skyrocketing increases in industrial
productivity, along with historically low unemployment
rates. Between 1950 and 1960 industrial production in West
Germany had risen to two-and-a-halftimes the level of 1950,
GOP grew by two-thirds, and the unemployment rate fell from
10.3 percent to an astonishing 1.2 percent (Haselbach 158).
Beyond its immediate success, the Social Market
Economic System gained both popularity and recognition
from the population at large in Germany. The degree of
importance this system holds in the minds of the German
people is best understood in light of the circumstances
under which this system emerged. At the end of Nazi rule in
Germany, recognizing the scale and gravity of the atrocities
committed under it, the German people could not deny that as
a group they had made a terrible mistake. In effect, this largely
destroyed any sense of national pride upon which Germans
could base their national identity. All chances had been lost
to formulate a positive identification with "Germanness" and
Germany's recent history.
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However, a society cannot function for very long
without a positive sense of collective identity, and in the wake
of the post-war destruction and hardship, it was the return
of prosperity under the economic miracle which would fill
this void in the mindset of the German people. The renewed
economic vitality which emerged under the institution of the
German Social Market Economy allowed Germans to take
pride in their collective industry and economic strength. The
success of the German economy under the Social Market
System came to form the founding myth upon which Germans
based their collective national identity.
In its popular conception, the German Social Market
Economy meant a departure from both the regulated Nazi
economy and the planned Soviet economy. This system
sought to balance a basic capitalist free-trade orientation with
a set of state-managed social safety nets. It is important to
note that this popular conception was not identical with the
meaning that Social Market Economy had for the group of
economists who had invented the term. However, as distorted
as the public understanding of the term might have been, the
ideological success of the German Social Market Economy
among the German people was just as important to the success
of the newly-formed FRG as the actual implementation of the
system.
In the years immediately following the Second World
War, the economic outlook for the majority of Germans was
exceptionally bleak. The successful restoration of bearable
living conditions for the German people, even in the most
optimistic of expectations, appeared to be many years away.
Everyday life was characterized by misery, destruction, and
hunger. The task of clearing the rubble from German cities
alone was expected to take a generation's work. According
to the idealized version of the narrative that would become
the founding myth of modem Germany, it was during this
most desperate hour that the political initiative and vision
of Ludwig Erhard returned the war-tom society to a path
of economic success. Through the currency reform of 1948
and his liberal program for a new economic policy, Erhard
catalyzed a period of unprecedented growth and prosperity
which would last into the 1970s. The Social Market Economic
System as instituted by Erhard had saved the people of West
Germany from hunger and despair and made them successful
and thus respectable once again. In light of these extraordinary
achievements, it becomes understandable why a German
author recently declared the Social Market Economy to be "up
~0 now, the most successful conception of economic policy
In the history of mankind" (Haselbach 157). 1 As extreme as
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this statement may sound, it is representative of a widely held
belief within Germany.2
Considering the importance Germans placed on their
economic system, it is easy to understand the great level of
concern caused when that system began to falter. In 1966,
Erhard himself had to resign his position as chancellor over
a mild economic crisis. However, this event would pale in
significance when compared with what was to come. The first
major blow to the German economy came in 1975, following
a dramatic upsurge in oil prices in the previous year. In 1975,
West Germany's GOP fell to negative 1.4 percent growth
(Ulman and Knut 22). Although GOP growth had recovered
by the following year, it began a downward trend which
led to another recession in the early I 980's. Throughout the
following years leading up to reunification, West Germany
continued to experience low growth rates, averaging only
I .9% GOP growth for the decade. Simultaneously in this
period, unemployment in West Germany doubled, growing
from 3.4% at the start of the decade to 6.8% by 1989.
During the time leading up to reunification in the
German Democratic Republic, there was a growing sense
of disenchantment with the communist eastern German
government, and its planned economy. East Germans had
suffered for years under a period of relative economic decline
in the face of growing wealth and prosperity in the West.
The Easterners were convinced that they had been kept from
living up to their economic potential by the system which
had been imposed on them following the Second World War.
The foundational myth of the FRG was believed here as it
was in West Germany. Many felt that once the constraints of
the Soviet-style system of central planning were lifted, they
too would experience the vigorous growth achieved by the
West following the war. In short, many in the East predicted
a second "economic miracle" to occur following reunification
and the implementation of free markets under a Iibcral
democratic government.
These views were widely held and propagated in the
West as well. Following the fall of the Berlin wall, Chancellor
Helmut Kohl helped win the election for his party's eastern
subsidiaries by promising a currency reform in the summer of
1990, calling back the memory of the I ~48 currency ref~rm ,
and its subsequent success. For the pubhc, ··currency reform
with the introduction of the economic and social laws of the
West, i.e., the "social market economy." seemed to guarantee
a repeat of the first miracle in the West. Chance~lor Kohl..
proclaimed that the East would .be tra~sf?rmed mto a h!Uhende
Landschaft (blooming countrystde) w1thm a few years of

.
.
_
R- , · Verteidiger des \!ittlestandes,- in Perspekrfl·e ::000. ed.
quotation, translated by Dieter Haselbach, was taken from Helmuth Seliger, Al~xander. utow-em l' . h K e ;ion in der Geschichte der \!enschheit
Lothar Bossie (Wiirzburg: Creator Verlag, 1987), p. 116: "Die bislang erfolgre~chste Wirtschaftspo_wsc e onz P
2
. (ist) [ ... ] unstreitig die von Ludwig Erhard in die. Wirklichkeit ~mgesetzte Soziale Markw.utscha~~!arket Econom .-was ..die erfolg,ersprechendste
To give one more example: In 1977, the prominent pohtical wnter Rudiger Altmann stated. that 'Soc:al'
..k ~ St trkunst fJirkung Ludwig Erhards.
1111
Wirtschaftspolitik des Kontinents- (the most promising economic policy of the contment"). ffmschaftspo
"'
aa ·
·
Aus Anla{Jseines acht:igsten Geburtstags (Bonn: Ludwig Erhardt-Stiftung, 1977), P· 5.
I Th.
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social and monetary union with the West. At this time, Ludwig
Erhard's book from 1957, Wohlstandfiir aile (Prosperity for
All), appeared newly in print and was distributed freely in
East German streets. It was a widely held belief among the
German people, both eastern and western, looking back on
the German Wirlschafiswunder of the 1950s, that history was
about to repeat itself (Haselbach 177).
However, the problems of stagnant GOP growth and
rising unemployment, which had surfaced in the FRG in the
1980s, were only intensified following German unification.
Since reunification in 1990, Germany has seen annual average
real growth of only 1.8% and unemployment rates have
averaged 7.5% over the same period (OECD Statistics 2007).
Before unification, West Germany had maintained a great
degree of social stability by alleviating social friction through
the redistribution of wealth. The resulting welfare state with
its generous unemployment benefits, universal health care,
comprehensive social security, and indexed pensions was
in tum dependent on a certain level of economic growth to
finance existing programs (Witt 368). The expansion of social
programs and entitlements to East Germany added pressure
to the already strained social budgets while straining relations
between East and West Germans. West Germans had to pay
more into the social budgets during a time when benefits
were being rolled back. And in the new federal states, the
application of West German social legislation contrasted
unfavorably with the much more comprehensive welfare
system that had previously existed in the GDR (Haselbach
175).
Many problems now face Germany as it seeks to
lower its unemployment, attract foreign investment, and
return growth rates to acceptably high levels. In this paper,
some of these important problems that Germany is currently
facing are explored. Section I will focus on the differences
bt:tween the mythos of the German Social Market Economy
and the actual preconditions and policy actions which spurred
the Wirtschatlswunder of the 1950s. Using this information
as a basis, I intend to shed some light on why the second
"economic miracle" never occurred. Section II addresses
one of Germany's most pressing problems today, facing its
very expensive and highly inflexible labor market. It will be
suggested that the current system of autonomous collective
wage bargaining is hindering Germany's gro\\1h potential
and thu_s explains Germany's trouble reforming this system.
In Sectwn Ill, German economic reform strategy enacted
in 2005, known as the ''Agenda 2010,'' will be described
including consideration of some of the specific goals set ~ut in
~his agenda and the progress that has been made in Germany
m response to these measures. The paper concludes with an
outlook on the u~comin.g challenges facing Germany as it
adapts to a post-mdustnally structured society in the modem
era of global capitalism.

Section I: The myth versus the reality behind the German
Economic Miracle
In the years directly following the Second World War,
the main task facing western policy-makers was to ensure
the basic living conditions of the population while building
up a new state and economy. Socialist and communist
politicians argued for a central distribution system, extensive
state controls, and the nationalization of banks and industry.
Leading their opposition, in favor of a liberal or capitalist
system, were two economist-politicians considered the fathers
of the Social Market Economy: Ludwig Erhard, who had
been appointed Minister of Economics in the first cabinet
of Konrad Adenauer and who would later serve as German
Chancellor, and Andreas Miiller-Armack, permanent secretary
in the Ministry of Trade and Commerce. These two figures
held between them the most powerful positions in determining
Germany's economic policy (Rosch l-2).
The task of restoring West Germany to a path of
economic success at this time must have seemed very
daunting, both to the German people and to politicians like
Erhard and Adenauer. Following the Second World War,
daily life for Germans was characterized by the death and
destruction left behind by the war, shortages of food and
decent housing, and a growing national shame as the scope
and scale ofNazi atrocities came more fully to light. And
yet, very soon after these darkest of days, the West German
economy was booming, unemployment was virtually
nonexistent, and the German people could once again take
pride in their collective industry and economic success as
growth and productivity rates soared. The 1950s mark the
decade of the German Economic Miracle, a miracle which
many felt had come about thanks to the return of free markets
under the Social Market Economy.
As successful as the Social Market Economy may
have been in the time directly following its inception, its
disappointing performance in recent years has called into
question how much of the early success was due to the system
itself, and how much had been caused by other factors. From
the early 1970s until very recently, economic growth in
Germany remained stagnant and unemployment rates hovered
persistently between six and nine percent (See Appendix 1).
Furthermore, during German reunification in the early 1990s,
a time when German politicians and people alike predicted
a second economic miracle following the introduction of
western liberal markets in the East the economic woes of
West Germany were only compou~ded as it struggled to
modernize the severely outdated Eastern industrial base.
Eastern Germans, rather than experiencing unprecedented
growth and prosperity, as had occurred years earlier in the
West, suffered under growing unemployment rates that
skyrocketed to as high as twenty percent in many areas
(Ulman 14).
Questions concerning these developments in
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Germany over the last decades abound: What were the
factors that catalyzed the Economic Miracle of the 1950s in
West Germany? Why could this success not be duplicated
years later in the East? And most importantly, how might
united Germany change its system to restore growth and
unemployment rates to acceptable levels?
To answer such questions, one must first consider the
factors stimulating the success of the 1948 currency reform.
After the collapse of Germany in 1945, the German economy
rapidly deteriorated into a barter economy. During this period,
German money was rendered virtually useless, serving neither
as a means of payment nor as a store of value. Individuals and
firms were forced to acquire most of the commodities they
needed by exchange against commodities they had to offer.
Often it was more profitable for employees to skip work for
part of the week so that they could cultivate private gardens,
or barter for commodities on the black market. By the middle
?f 1948 the economy had reached a state of paralysis resulting
Ill near-starvation for a large part ofthe population (Lutz 122).
It was against this backdrop that the currency reform of 1948
was enacted.
One of the key reasons why the miracle of economic
recovery in Germany became so convincing was the claim
that West Germany was starting from scratch at the time of
the currency reform. On the 20th of June in 1948, the day of
the currency reform, each West German citizen received forty
D~utsche Marks, the new money to replace the inftationstncken Reichsmark (Haselbach 161 ). Referring to the Social
Market mythos, this was the first day in Germany when free
markets were able to work their magic. In the course ofthis
d~y, the black market suddenly disappeared in correspondence
With the return of the supply of food and commodities.
Shop windows that had been empty the day prior were now
adorned with a new abundance of much-needed merchandise.
Foll~wing years of want and starvation, this day did seem like
a miracle to the millions of Germans who lived through it.
Although the astounding change accomplished on
the day of the currency reform did much to restore the
co.nfidence and optimism of the German people, calling it a
~rracle ignores many of the key elements that contributed to
Its fruition. The currency reform did not kick off recovery.
Rather, it was one carefully staged step in the process of
returning Germany to the path of economic grmvth (Haselbach
162).
One of the most significant factors contributing to
Germany's successful economic recovery following the war
was the presence of a modern and relatively intact industrial
base. Under National Socialism, particularly during the war,
Germany's economy had been very successful for two main
reasons. For one, through their military acquisitions during
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the war, the Nazis had access to an abundant supply oflabor
in the occupied territories and were able to exploit a wealth
of raw materials to which they had gained access. Also, the
system of economic planning under the Nazis had been quite
successful. The Nazis succeeded in combining the resources
at their disposal with the initiative of the German economy
that they had inherited. Although the destruction resulting
from Allied bombardments in the final weeks of the war had
been devastating to both the housing and the transportation
infrastructures, much of the industry proper was lett relatively
untouched. All in all, due to Nazi successes, Germany's
postwar economy inherited a highly modem industrial stock.J
To a great extent, it was this inherited industrial base that set
the stage for the subsequent successes experienced under the
Social Market System (Haselbach 163).
The immediate and visible success of the currency
reform in 1948 can be attributed to other factors preceding
that landmark day. As early as 1947, the economy had
already turned a comer toward recovery thanks to a carefully
crafted policy of central allocation of scarce resources.
The introduction of the new currency would not have been
effective without the preexisting recovering economy to back
it (Ibid 164).
The sudden appearance of commodities in shop
windows on the day of the reform can be understood in light
of the manner in which the reform was introduced. German
politicians had openly announced the coming of a major
day of economic reckoning months before the reform itself.
This information had sent wholesalers and producers a clear
signal to hoard commodities. Knowing that the reform was
imminent, traders did not want to sell against the dying
Reichsmark, waiting instead to exchange their goods for the
newly established Deutschmark (OM). In the month preceding
the reform, the supply of goods in retail shops had dried up
almost completely, only to be newly replenished with the
introduction of the new currency (Lutz 132).
Along with initiating the return of commodities to
German shops, the currency reform marked the beginning of
substantial increases in productivity and output in the German
economy. Before the close of the year in 1948, industrial
production had already risen by an astounding 53 pe~ce~t (Ibid
133). This rapid growth was set off by a number of significant
factors. Prior to the currency reform. part of productiOn
undoubtedly went into hidden stocks, or was used for bartering
purposes, and was not reported. Thus output figures preceding
the reform most likely underrepresented actual output. Also,
the introduction of the new currency significantly lowered the
rate of absenteeism in the work place. Following the currency
reform, the rate of absenteeism dropped from 9.5 hours a
week in May to only 4.2 hours by October. The new currency

31
.
.
. ood th
d f th ·ar following the war, much of eastern
at e en
ew •
n contrast to the West, where occupying Allied forces left much of the German mdustnal as 1t st
Germany's industrial stock was disassembled and carried off by the Russians.

°

https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol8/iss1/9

4

Cheek: What is Ailing the German Economy? A Critical Analysis of German

50 INQUIRY Volume 8 2007

had made it once again worthwhile to work for money, rather
than spend time foraging and bartering. Moreover, with
the return of a functioning currency came a drop in the real
costs associated with executing business transactions. Time
formerly spent arranging complicated barter agreements could
finally be used toward more productive ends (Ibid 133).
The visible efTects of the reform evident in shop
windows, combined with substantial increases in output
productivity and quality of life, helped to convince the public
at large that the new currency was reliable. This, in turn,
boosted consumer confidence, further aiding the progress
of economic recovery. Economic growth in Germany
was additionally aided by an increased world demand for
manufactured goods, stimulated by the Korean War. For much
of this period, German exports also enjoyed a competitive
advantage in international markets because the German
currency was undervalued, making German goods cheaper in
foreign markets (Haselbach 163-166).
Given this extraordinary set of circumstances, Germany
was well positioned for a boom as it entered the 1950s.
This growth potential certainly could have been spoiled by
ineffective economic policies, and much credit is due to
both Erhard and the West German government at that time.
However, crediting the theoretical formula of the Social
Market Economy for the success enjoyed during this decade
is wrong for two reasons: because it ignores the governing
set of circumstances preceding the expansion, and because
the policy actions of Ludwig Erhard were less driven by a
coherent theory of economic practice than by an astonishing
pr~gmatism (Ibid 164). Although the Social Market Economy
mtght well be described as a variation of market liberalism
and under Erhard markets were indeed liberalized whereve~
economically feasible, he did not hesitate to resort to state
c~ntrol and planning in fields where it seemed appropriate to
htm, such as in housing, coal supply, or agriculture. Social
market theory recommends the establishment of markets
framed by institutional regulations, with these regulations
standing as the only checks against the self-destructive
h:ndencies in market economies. However, Erhard did not
follow this form of governance, instead using state action in
the market proper as a standard tool of his policy (Ibid 164).
These conditions surrounding the introduction of
the Social Market Economy are important to remember
whe_n consid:ring the disappointing outcome following
th_e mtroductwn of the West German currency in the East
att:r reun_ificatio~ in the_ 1990s. Most notably, the currency
reform ~t I 948 dtd not, m and of itself, catalyze recovery.
~ther, tt was me~ely a step amongst a large set of preexisting
circumstances whtch, as an aggregate, produced the vigorous
growth rates of the 1950s.
4

How different was the situation in eastern Germany
in the time leading up to reunification! Virtually none of the
factors contributing to West Germany's success in the 1950s
were present in East Germany leading up to the 1990s. East
Germany had suffered from a long period of relative economic
decline in the face of the growing wealth in the West, which
left it with an outdated industrial stock, as opposed to the
modernized stock of West Germany following World War
II. Rather than possessing an undervalued currency to boost
competitiveness in international markets, East Germany
was burdened, under the "currency reform," with the highly
appreciated DM, making East German goods more expensive
in foreign markets. The introduction of this new currency not
only failed to help the eastern German economy, but it hurt the
area and contributed to a sharp decline of economic activity.
It was only the comparative strength of the West German
economy and an enormous and ongoing transfer of wealth that
kept East Germany's economy from a total breakdown, since
it was fully exposed to the world market after currency reform
(Haselbach 178).
The disappointing performance of East Germany
following market liberalization and the introduction of
a western currency illustrates the point that growth and
economic success are not guaranteed by trade liberalization
if other necessary preconditions are not also met. In the
same way, it was not so much the Social Market Economy
that was responsible for West Germany's success, but rather
a combination of the aforementioned preconditions in
combination with an appropriate economic policy.

Section II: The high cost of labor in Germany
When asked what could be causing the chronically high
rates of unemployment experienced in Germany over the last
several decades, political and economic experts alike point to
~high-cost and highly inflexible labor market.4 Simply put,
tt has become too expensive for many firms to hire workers
in Germany. Furthermore, once a firm has hired workers in
the country, an extensive body of labor laws and restrictions
regulates nearly every aspect associated with maintaining
those workers, including making it very difficult for firms to
lay them off (Economist, 2003). Over the years, these factors
have forced firms in Germany to either reduce employment or
~ove elsewhere, and have scared away a multitude of outside
mvestment and employment opportunities.
The vast array of labor market problems in existence
~oday may be attributed to the nature and development of
mdustrial relations in Germany. The Social Market Economic
sy~tem, which emerged from the post-war period under the
gut dance of Ludwig Erhard, is often described as a blending
of ideas from liberal thought (most notably, stressing a basic
free-trade orientation) with a set of social precepts that modify

The debate ov·er Gennany's attractiveness as a location for investment in r
·
··. .
. p oductlon faclltttes 15 encapsulated by the phrase ~standort Deutschland" and can be
found in a wide array of academic publications For a ood d
·
g
escnptton of the Issue see Harding (1999), Tiiselmann (1995, 1998), and Zumwinkle (1995).
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the outcome of the market process through redistributive
measures for the sake of balance and social security. These
social precepts indicative of the Social Market Economy were
incorporated via a system of extensive social welfare, along
with a system of autonomous collective wage bargaining (Witt
366).
This system of collective bargaining, which comprises
the defining element of German industrial relations , won
support in the aftermath ofthe Nazi era as a counterweight
to the power of the state and large-scale industry in the
operation of the Social Market Economy. While it was the
responsibility of the government under this system to socialize
risks and provide economic security to wage earners (i.e., to
provide social welfare), this power was counterbalanced by
the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy oftrade unions and
employer associations in the determination of wages under
collective bargaining. The latter institution was intended to
function as an instrument of social justice by establishing
parity of bargaining power between workers and employers.
It_ was also the intent of this system to help reduce income
differentials and tensions between the two classes and avert
industrial unrest (Koch 234-254). Although the system of
collective wage bargaining has proved successful in many
of these respects, this institution has also had a number of
unfortunate consequences.
As a direct result of Germany's system of industrial
relations, the cost of labor in Germany, represented by wages
or salaries and non-wage benefits, has risen over the past thirty
years to one of the highest levels in the world. West German
workers cost on average €27.60 an hour, compared with
€19.90 in Britain and € 18.80 in America (Economist, Aug
2005). A large portion of these labor costs can be attributed
to so-called "non-wage labor costs." According to the annual
analysis by the Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, non-wage
labor costs are defined as those categories ofthe enterprise's
total labor costs other than direct compensation (Chen 2).
From 1972 to 2000, the ratio of non-wage labor costs to direct
compensation grew by 25.6 percentage points to 81.2%. This
represents the highest level of non-wage labor costs in the
Euro-zone (Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft 2001, table 148).
Apart from expensive labor, corporations in Germany
must shoulder a heavy tax burden and a set of highly inflexible
market regulations. As of 2004, the basic level of corporate tax
stood at 38.7%, the highest rate in Western Europe (Economist
May 8 2004). Furthermore, labor regulations developed
~nder the German system of industrial relations have made
It extremely difficult for firms to fire workers once they are
employed. For example, at the end of2003, it took Software
AG, a globally active firm based in Darmstadt, three months
to lay off200 of its employees. In the U.S., the same measure
took the company only two weeks to complete. The fact that it
was possible for Software AG to make these lay-offs at all was
only due to the enactment of Agenda 20 I 0 reforms earlier that
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year, which loosened job protections enough to allow the layoffs to occur (Economist May 8 2004). In the modem era of
increasingly free trade and global capitalism, firms are gaining
considerably more freedom to locate their production facilities
in areas where factor costs are most efficient. The combination
of high costs and inflexibility has both discouraged outside
firms from investing in Germany and caused many of
Germany's domestic firms to move their operations elsewhere,
for instance to central European countries where labor costs
average below €5 per hour (Economist, Aug. 20 2005).
At first glance, Germany's system of autonomous
collective bargaining between employers' associations and
trade unions may seem to be both an effective and efficient
method for protecting worker interests. Indeed, the system
has enjoyed great popularity and acclaim over the years of
its existence, both within Germany and in other European
countries where it has often been cited as an exemplarily
stable and highly functional model for the regulation of
working conditions. The principle of co-determination
between management and employees, carried out on the
company level in Germany through the works council
(Betriebsrat), most notably in the 1960s, helped create a
strong foundation within German companies by maintaining
harmony between workers and employers (Economist May 8
2004). Further, because the whole process is self-regulated by
the union and employer groups directly involved, it relieves
the state of the burden of regulating and legitimating labor
standards (Winter 183).
As numerous as arguments in favor of Germany's
model of industrial relations may be, there remain manifold
aspects of the system that are clearly problematic in both a
theoretical and an empirical sense. Throughout the course of
years of repeated wage negotiations, union representatives
have succeeded in obtaining an income distribution
significantly higher than the competitive outcome, and have
shielded union workers through extensive labor laws to a
great extent against layoffs and other job risks. Unit labor
costs in Germany, which stood at 60 percent of the U.S. level
in 1970, reached over 140 percent by 1990. In this same
period, productivity growth in German~ was lower than i~ the
U.S. (Ulman 12). While these accomplishments are certamly
very beneficial to union members. their effects have proven
devastating to firms that must compete on the global market.
Furthermore, this method of socially correcting free markets
gives rise to a rent-seeking dilemma that casts doubt on.
whether the implementation of such a method has anythmg to
do with the pursuit of social goals at all.
In his paper titled "Germany's Social ~~arket_Economy:
Between Social Ethos and Rent Seeking." Ulnch Witt of the
Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems
outlines with great clarity the dilemma associated with . .
Germany's system of collective, centralized ";age b~a~mng.
He begins with the concession that decisions m negotmtwns
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are indeed reached by mutual agreement between the labor
and employer interests. He continues by qualifying that this
agreement is made by the representatives of the associations
and not by the individual parties bound by the wage contract.
Witt argues that in this seemingly insignificant detail lies the
system's greatest problem:
The majority opinion within the employer associations
determines their judgment about the acceptability of
an agreement. Experience suggests that this opinion is
based on whether the resulting cost increases (direct
wages and salaries plus non-wage labor costs) of
different grades of labor can be recouped without
loss of profitability in the industry. It is doubtful,
however, whether the majority opinion, especially
under the pressure of actual or potential strike, takes
sufficient account of the variance in the profitability
of all member firms. Because the member firms are
not allowed to pay less than the union rate, firms at the
lower end of the profitability distribution are forced to
reduce employment or even to go out of business when
wages and non-wage labor costs rise. This outcome
occurs even where the employees of these firms are
willing to work under conditions worse than those
specified in the agreement. (Witt 372)
In other words, by requiring wage and benefit increases
to be implemented across entire industries, many companies
that under normal circumstances would be economically
viable are no longer able to make profits, resulting in the
need to lay off workers, move facilities elsewhere, or even
terminate operations. Until very recently, despite the fact that
the unemployment problem has been growing progressively
worse since the mid-l970s, German labor unions have
continued their strategy in negotiation rounds of seeking wage
and benefit increases equal to the estimated average annual
gain in labor productivity. Union representatives in practice do
not have to admit responsibility for ill effects resulting from
their contracts because, in the Social Market Economy, the
ind~vi~ual unemployment risk is covered by state-managed
socml msurance and public assistance. To frame the problem
in the economic terminology of costs and benefits, the benefits
of an expansive wage policy are reaped privately by union
members, while the costs are born collectively by German
taxpayers (Witt 372-373).
~lthoug~ the ~roblems resulting from the highly
expensive and mftex1ble German labor market have become
increas_ingly obvious, efforts towards reforming the system of
collective wage bargaining behind it have been held back for
a number of reasons. First and foremost stands the country's
federal power structure, spread over the 16 independent
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Lander, which was deliberately designed after the Second
World War to weaken the ability of a central government to
impose radical reform. Numerous failed attempts to reform
Germany's labor laws in recent years have proven this system
to be all too effective (Economist May 8 2004). Furthermore,
the Law on Collective Agreements (Tarifvertragsgesetz),
which forms the legal basis for sectoral relations between
employers and unions, was incorporated into the German
Constitution (Gnmdgesetz) in 1949 and has remained largely
unchanged ever since (Winter 189). Finally, the system of
collective bargaining has operated in Germany for many
years, retaining a high degree of popularity in the country.
As a result, politicians frequently shy away from the issue of
reforming Germany's cumbersome and expensive labor laws
(Economist May 8 2004).
Although the system of collective wage bargaining
in Germany certainly has resulted in healthy worker/
employer relations and a high degree of wage equality across
employment sectors throughout Germany, the problems
resulting from the system, such as high unemployment and an
inflexible labor market, bring into question whether the system
has helped Germany at all. In spite of the many arguments
claiming that free competition will ultimately drive wages
below the cost ofliving,5 one thing is clear: if the problem
of unemployment in Germany is ever going to be solved, the
country must move to deregulate its labor markets and lower
the cost of employment to a more competitive level. Although
such reforms might sacrifice a certain degree of pay equality,
the benefits brought on by lower unemployment and higher
economic growth would certainly result in an increased level
of"Wohlstandfiir alle" (prosperity for all).

Section III: Agenda 2010
In 2005, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder
spearheaded a series of reforms known as Agenda 2010.
The purpose of this reform package was to modernize the
German social system and labor market. The main aims of
these reforms were to improve economic growth and thus
reduce unemployment. The agenda focused on three areas:
the economy, the system of social benefits, and Germany's
position in the world market. Specific reform steps to be taken
included reductions in health care benefits, restructuring labor
regulations, tax cuts, and an overhaul of the pension system
(Deutsche Welle Oct. 17 2003).
In a speech delivered on March 14, 2003 introducing
the reforms, Schroder asserted that a massive effort from
all sections of society would be needed to carry out these
important reforms. Indeed, the span and magnitude of the
Agenda 2010 reforms were unprecedented and touched on
a wide range of government actions. Monthly premium

· ·
A popular form of this argument denotes competition via free markets and 10 b l
phrase "low wage or no wage~ fl"'uses on the t d ffb
g a capttahsm as a "race to the bonom." Another argument, encapsulated by the
'
v~
ra
e-o
etween
greater
p
- unemployment and greater
pav inequaJitv. For a good summary ofth" d b t
B
ay equan1 Yan d h"tg her unemployment versus lower
.,
IS e a e, see rueckner, 2000.

Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2007

7

Inquiry: The University of Arkansas Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 8 [2007], Art. 9

FOREIGN LANGUAGES: Robert T. Cheek, Jr.

payments for the national healthcare system were to be
gradually reduced from 14.3% of an employee's income
to 12.15% by 2006. The reduced premium was aimed at
lowering Germany's staggering non-wage labor costs. To
finance the cuts, certain non-vital health procedures would
no longer be financed by the public health fund, and patients
would be required to co-pay for doctor visits and prescriptions
Also, to introduce more flexibility into Germany's heavily
regulated labor market, a reform was passed making it easier
for companies to hire and fire employees (Eironline Mar. 31
2003).
The most controversial section of the reforms, known
as Hartz IV, merged unemployment and welfare benefits.
The Hartz IV reforms reduced to 12 months the time during
which a person can receive maximum unemployment benefits
following job-loss. In addition, long-term unemployment
benefits, which formerly paid out as much as 57 percent of
a person's last regular net income, were reduced to a capped
level of 345 Euros per month. These benefits were further
qualified, making those with a working spouse or assets
exceeding 13,000 Euros ineligible for payments. Also included
in this reform package was a tax cut changing the country's
progressive tax rate from 19.9% to 15% at the lowest level
and from 48.5% to 42% at the highest level. Other reforms
included eliminating the requirement of a master craftsman's
diplomas in 65 skilled trades before a worker is allowed to
be self-employed, an increase in the age of pension eligibility
from 65 to 67, along with a reduction of pension levels from
40.1% to 38% of a recipient's former income, and an increase
in the percentage received by communities oflocal business
tax from 2.2% to 3.6% (Deutsche Welle Oct. 17 2003).
The Agenda 2010 reforms have already helped the
economy make a remarkable turnaround. In 2006, Germany's
GDP was up by 2. 7%, the highest increase since 2000.
Productivity also rose by 2%, a remarkable improvement,
considering productivity growth averaged only 0.7%
between 1998 and 2004 (Investor Business Daily Apr. 9
2007). Germany's traditionally strong export sector has also
been booming, with exports increasing by 12.5% in 2006.
A recent survey from Ifo., a Munich economics-research
institute, shows business confidence to have reached a 15-year
high. This recent succession of improvements serves as an
indication that Germany is well into the upward curve of a
typical eight-to-nine year investment cycle (Economist Jan. 5
2007).
Two years ago such a turnaround seemed hardly
possible. In March of2005, unemployment peaked at 12.1 %.
This alarming rate of unemployment helped convince German
unions to agree to longer hours and even wage cuts in some
cases. Such concessions in combination with recent reforms
have allowed German corporations to make considerable
improvements in cost competitiveness. Since the end of
2001, unit labor costs have fallen by 13.4%, compared to a
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7.7% increase in the U.S. (Investor Business Daily Apr. 9
2007). Real wages per employee since 2000 have increased
a modest 6%. This recent practice of wage moderation has
given German companies a comparative advantage over rivals
in France, Italy and Spain where, in the same period, wages
increased by 12%, 18%, and 27% respectively (Economist
Jan. 5 2007).
To a great extent, this recovery has been driven by the
recent successes of Germany's large corporations. Over the
past two years, they have been making significant structural
adjustments, cutting costs vigorously, investing abroad and
holding down wages. Recent government reforms have
also helped companies regain their competitive edge, by
introducing more labor flexibility and lowering corporate taxes
from 38.6% to 29.8% (Investor Business Daily Apr. 9 2007).
As a result, corporate profits in Germany are healthy and the
DAX, a stock index for Germany's top 30 companies, climbed
nearly 30% in 2006 to its highest levels since 2000 (Ibid).
Although the economic situation in Germany has
improved considerably over the last year, the outlook for the
next several years is not entirely rosy. Doubts remain about
the durability of this recent German revival. The German
Achilles' heel of low consumer spending has failed to make
significant improvements in recent years. Although domestic
consumption has picked up, improvements have been largely
confined to the areas of transport, communications, leisure
and entertainment, with consumers still holding back when
it comes to spending on food, holidays at home, and clothing
(Economist Jan. 5 2007). Third quarter data from 2006 shows
expenditures as being up by only 0.8% since 2003, when
expenditures decreased by 0.5% (Warton Mar. 28 2007).
This would indicate that recent GDP improvements have
been largely sustained by German exports, leaving Germany
susceptible to a downturn in the global economy. Furthermore,
the strengthening euro in relation to the weakening dollar
will undoubtedly put increased pressure on Germany's export
sector in the coming years (Ibid).

Outlook: The Need for Further Reform
In a speech given to a conference by the Federation of
German Industries (BDI) and the Confederation of German
Employers' Associations (BOA) on October 16, 20?6, Joaquin
Almunia, the European Commissioner for Economic and
Monetary Policy, evaluated the progress of the Agenda 20!0
reforms and proposed a number of further steps the Ge~an
government should take in reforming its e~onomy.. I~ h1s ..
speech he praised German etTorts at reduc1~g admmtstratl\ e
burdens and the costs of starting a new busmess. He stated
that the overall strength of the recent reform efforts "':as th~.
determination to raise the country's innovatiYe capactty. C~ttng
the Commission's assessment of the 2005 reforms, Alumma
highlighted the need for more competition in ~ermany,.
p~icuiariy in public procurement. in ~rofesswnal servtces,
and in the provision of broadband serv1ces.
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Germany faces the additional long-term challenge
of boosting its growth potential against the backdrop of
unfavorable demographics-an aging population and a low
fertility rate. One way to do this is to encourage business
investment. Strong investment growth will lead to a faster
expansion in the capital stock and a correspondingly strong
rise in production capacities. In order to encourage future
investment, Germany must continue its efforts in moderating
labor costs and reducing the burden of restrictive labor laws.
Although, lower growth in labor costs is unlikely to improve
domestic demand, over the long-term wage moderation will
help to strengthen and sustain Germany's competitiveness on
the global market. If Germany continues to make progress,
investment will continue to rise and consumer demand will
benefit from greater growth in disposable incomes (Wharton
Mar. 28 2007).
The ambitious measures set forth in the Agenda 2010
reform package have already done and will continue to do a
great deal to prepare Germany for the age of global trade and
competition. The lofty aims of delivering sustainable growth,
full employment, stability, and security within Germany
and the European Union, are desirable and deserving of
the universal efforts ofEU member states toward their
achievement. Furthermore, in order to preserve Europe's
uniquely high standard ofliving over the coming years, it is
absolutely necessary that these issues be addressed and dealt
with effectively. If carried through, these policy actions will
continue to both shape the face of Europe positively and to
serve as a model for nations adapting to a post-industrial
economic structure for years to come.
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As Dr. Judith Ricker writes to recommend publication of Mr.
Cheek's research in Inquiry, her enthusiasm is obvious.

Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2007

Robert Cheek, a Chancellors Scholar majoring
in German, Economics and European Studies, has
completed an exciting, original, and highly relevant
research project. In keeping with his broad range
of interests, he selected a multi-disciplinary project
spanning half a century and involving all three fields
titled "What Is Ailing the German Economy? A Critical
Analysis of German Social,\larket Economics." This
project allowed him to draw on information gained
in relevant courses taken on this campus as well as in
Austria, where he spent his junior year studying at the
Karl-Franzens-Universitiit in Graz.
Ever since I have known him, Robert has been keenly
interested in the economic situation in Germanv. When
time came for him to select a research project, he
wanted to e:r:plore whv the German economv had been
stagnating for years. -It was at a time when-Chancellor
Schroeder, a socialist, had tried to introduce badlv
needed changes but had continued to lose voter support. In a desperate attempt to solidi.fj.• his position,
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he called for earlyfederal elections. Robert followed
the heated debates about the jitture of the German
economy that ensued and dominated the campaign
against challenger Angela Aferkel. All major and minor
parties offered economic remedies. When neither major
party lron a solid majorif); the country was thrown
into turmoil. Ultimately, Schroeder stepped down. The
coalition that was formed required compromises that
made it dijJicultfor Germany to push through the major
changes necessal}'for the German economy to begin
flourishing again. Robert had the unique opportunity
to monitor policy changes as they evolved when the
Merkel government took over the reigns.
As Robert researched his topic, he became more
and more interested in the history of the German
economy. Specifical(v. he wanted to explore why the
Wirtschaftsmmder. the "economic miracle" that
had defined the post-war German economy, could
not be duplicated in former East Germany after the
unification.
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successjitl Social Market Economy ofthe Federal
Republic. it is to his credit that he looked beyond the
myths surrounding the post-war German economic
boom, studying instead the main theoretical bases for
the Social Market Economy.
The next step was for Robert to assess the conditions
that existed in the former German Democratic
Republic, comparing them to the conditions in post1945 West Germany, as well as the economic conditions
in the old Federal Republic as the two Germanys were
reunited. He identified the principle problems that
prevented a second economic miracle from occurring
and, along the way, identified what ails the German
economy. He ended his study with an analysis of recent
German strategies, principally Schroeder s Agenda
2010 reform package, to address the challenges that
mature, post-industrial economies like Germany s face
due to increased globalization.
Roberts project was very challenging. He read through
a vast amount ofsophisticated literature, both in
English and in German that provided him with the
background information he needed. The fact that had
the language skills to read widely in both languages
was critical for the project.

In order to provide an answer to this question, Robert
had to go back to 1945 to identijj· the factors that lead
to the Wirtschajiswunder and explore the economic
schools of thought that subsequently lead to the highly
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